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Abstract—Development processes for software construction
are common knowledge and widely used in most development
organizations. Unfortunately, these processes often offer only
little or no support in order to meet security requirements.
In our work, we propose a methodology to enhance these
process models with security concepts, backed by a security-
oriented process model specification language. The methodol-
ogy supports existing process models, which will be extended
by established security approaches, as well as information
security risk management standards, to fulfill the demand
for secure software engineering. The methodology and the
process modeling language we propose, have been successfully
evaluated by the TERESA project for specifying development
processes for trusted applications and integrating security
concepts into existing process models.
Keywords-Secure Software Engineering, Process Modeling,
Repository, Reuse, Model-Driven Engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
Development processes for software construction are com-
mon knowledge and mainstream practice in most devel-
opment organizations. Unfortunately, these processes offer
little support in order to meet security requirements and are
rarely formalized. As a consequence, there are increased
risks of security vulnerabilities that are introduced into
software in various stages of development. Secure software
(or software security) engineering aims to avoid security
vulnerabilities in software by considering security aspects
from the very beginning and throughout the life cycle. From
another perspective, formalizing processes offers the ability
to teach and communicate them and to reason about them.
The SEMCO1 project tries to close this gap by offering a
Model-Driven Engineering framework for, on the one hand,
modeling and formalizing artifacts (e.g., security patterns)
and on the other hand to provide methodologies for model-
based development (e.g., pattern-based security-oriented en-
gineering). Modeling is becoming a major paradigm in
system engineering and particularly in system software
engineering [1], but also in process engineering with the
appearance of process metamodels [2].
In this work, we propose a process modeling environment,
which associates model-driven paradigms and established
security engineering concepts, to support the design of
repository-centric security-oriented process models. In this
1http://www.semcomdt.org
context, we propose a methodology on enhancing existing
process models through security aspects as well a meta-
model to formalize development processes with security
constraints. To enable reuse, common industry-relevant ap-
proaches for considering security aspects in process models
are made available to process designers through a set of
model libraries. As part of the assistance for the modeling of
process models for secure applications, we implement a tool-
chain to support the different activities of process modeling
and a repository, providing a set of reusable libraries. The
proposed solutions were evaluated in the TERESA project2.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
outlines existing work on process metamodels and (security-
oriented) models. Section III shows our approach on adding
security concepts to existing process models. Section IV
outlines parts RCPM (Repository Centric Process Meta-
model) for security-oriented process modeling. Section V
describes how to use RCPM to formalize security-oriented
processes and security type libraries. Section VI shows a
case study from the Metrology Domain; a basic process
model, formalized and augmented by a security type library.
Section VII concludes this paper, discussing the advantages
and limits of our approach and giving an outlook on future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
We will give an overview on the existing approaches
on formalizing process models, on industry-relevant process
models as well as on approaches on taking into account
security concepts.
Process Metamodeling: Different process metamodels
are proposed [3], [4] for modeling software engineering
processes. These process metamodels are divided into dif-
ferent categories according to [5]. The viewpoint of process
metamodel concentrates different aspects of methodologies
that are used by these metamodels. In our context, process
models will be created with the viewpoint of activity-
oriented, as the development of security-oriented systems is
more directly modeled in this viewpoint. SPEM2 (Software
& Systems Process Engineering Metamodel) [3] was created
by the OMG as a de facto, high-level standard for processes
used in object-oriented software development. The scope of
2http://www.teresa-project.org/
SPEM is purposely limited to the minimal elements neces-
sary to define any software and system development process,
without adding specific features for particular development
domains or disciplines (e.g., project management, security).
Other commonly used process metamodels like UMA or
OPEN have similar characteristics.
Process Models: The V-Model [6] development pro-
cess, also called verification & validation model, is sug-
gested by the standard IEC61508. It is a trustworthy software
development model, which aims at taming the complexity of
project management, and which is used by big companies.
The Rational Unified Process (RUP), an implementation of
the Unified Process, is a comprehensive process framework
that provides industry-tested practices for software engi-
neering [4]. It is an iterative software development process
framework, providing prototypes during each iteration.
Security Processes, Process Models and Process Stan-
dards: We outline the forefront representatives, as they
are recognized as the major players in the field, as well
as additional industry standards. Microsoft’s Security De-
velopment Life cycle [7] is probably the most rigorous
and more oriented towards large organizations, defining a
process with guidance, allowing a management perspective
to supervise the process. The Comprehensive, Lightweight
Application Security Process [8] by the OWASP Consortium
is a lightweight process, allowing customization to fit dif-
ferent projects and focussing on security as the central role
of the system. McGraw’s work [9] is based on industrial
experience and has been validated over time, providing
a set of best practices. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation [10] is a ISO/IEC standard
for computer security certification and defining a generic
framework offering process designers to specify security
functional requirements through protection profiles.
III. APPROACH
The methodology we propose is based on a repository
of modeling artifacts. Once the repository is set up and
populated with process model libraries and process type
libraries, the (end-user) process engineer begins building
domain specific process models. The central idea of our
approach is to enable security-concepts in existing process
models in a direct way. To achieve this, we map necessary
concepts in General Purpose Process Description Language
(GPPDL) to concepts of a Security-Oriented Process De-
scription Language (SOPDL), to be able to represent the
existing process in a more adapted language. The second
step is to add security concepts in a direct way and to be
able to validate the process via existing rules. Once security
concepts added and the process passes validation, a reverse
mapping is done to produce a security enhanced process
from the original one and the security oriented one.
The methodology is illustrated in Figure 1. On the left
side is the workflow of the process in a GPPDL and on the
Figure 1. Add-On Methodology Overview
right the actions taken on the process in a SOPDL. Steps
Step1 and Step4 show the tasks of mapping a process from
GPPDL to SOPDL and vice-versa. Step1 does a forward
mapping of the concepts used in the process model described
in a SOPDL and allows the creation of a (semi-) complete
process model in the GPPDL.
In the first step, Step1, optional if the process model is
already defined in the SOPDL, allows process designers to
represent their process models in the SOPDL. By mapping
the concepts of the GPPDL to the concepts of SOPDL the
designer can now use the process model in the supporting
framework.
In the next step, Step2, the process designer is adding
security concepts to the process in a simple and direct way
using the SOPDL. In a first review on the process model, the
designer can explicitly convert existing implicit concepts to
explicit security concepts from the SOPDL. Then, existing
knowledge can be added to the process model defined by
type libraries, which are made available to the process
designer via a repository of process type libraries.
Once the additional security concepts added to the process
model, the process designer validates (Step3) the process
model to several concerns. The first validation done is
towards the SOPDL, to validate the conformance of the
process model in terms of its syntax. The second validation
allows the process designer to see if the integration of
the model type library is complete and well done. If the
validation in step Step3 fails, action Step2, needs to be
reiterated until the validation passes.
Several type libraries exist for different security approaches
as well as for supporting engineering methods, such as
Pattern-Based System Engineering (PBSE), and existing
process models can be enhanced by multiple libraries. The
last, optional, step (Step4), permits the process designer to
map the modified process model back and to merge it with
the initial process model (backwards mapping). This allows
the process designer to benefit of supplementary tooling
available for the initial PDL.
IV. RCPM CONCEPTS FOR SECURITY AND REUSE
The RCPM is a metamodel defining a new formalism for
security process modeling based on a repository of modeling
artifacts. The concepts of the metamodel3, which are only
briefly outlined have been presented in previous work [11],
[12]. In the following we will outline the different packages.
We will focus on sub-packages important for our and detail
only these.
Core Package: The Core Package contains the elements
which are used as top-level elements throughout the other
packages and contain the basic attributes of all elements.
These concepts include basic concepts (e.g., Element, Asso-
ciation) and their attributes (e.g., name, description).
Process Package: The Process Package contains all the
concepts used for process engineering, the basic concepts,
like Process Model, concepts of a work breakdown structure
and concepts needed for detailing activities. This package is
largely inspired by either existing process metamodels, such
as SPEM2, UMA and/or OPF as well as by industry used
process models such as the V-Modell XT.
Safety Engineering Package: Based on the Process
Package, the Safety Engineering Package regroups recurring
Safety Engineering Concepts and extends and enhances
process concepts. The safety concepts of this package are
derived from process models which are safety oriented, such
as the V-Modell XT.
Security Engineering Package: The Security Engineer-
ing Package regroups recurring Security Concepts and Se-
curity Concepts linked to specific phases in the development
life cycle, like Roles, Activities or Checkpoints (e.g., Secu-
rityEngineer, ThreatModeling, SecurityMetrics, CodeInspec-
tion, RequirementsAudit, RiskAssessment). It is based on the
Process and the Safety Package and reuses their concepts to
express security-oriented concepts.
Type Package: The Types Package is used to define
libraries for reuse of process blocks and to create con-
straints on Breakdown, Work Breakdown and Association
Elements. The type elements correspond to the existing
process elements and associations in the other packages
(i.e., process, safety, security, repository). The Type Package
allows to create reusable process blocks, using a structure
similar to the existing (Work) Breakdown Structure and the
Process/Pattern/Safety/Security Concepts, without the need
to create a whole process model. These block are stored
as process model libraries and can be loaded into existing
process models. Elements in existing process models can
3The complete description of the abstract syntax of the RCPM is available
online http://www.semcomdt.org/semco/resources/RCPM.pdf
now be typed by elements from the model library and are
thus enhanced by the additional information.
V. SECURITY-ORIENTED PROCESS MODELING
We propose an incremental specification process consist-
ing of the following phases: (1) the specification of the
security oriented process model, (2) the refinement using
appropriate model libraries. The target representation is
RCPM. The informal description given in Section IV re-
flects our understanding from the representation of security-
oriented process modeling given in literature. To create
model instances of the proposed metamodel, we provide
a concrete syntax. We choose to use a EBNF grammar to
define a concrete syntax for the RCPM language.
Model Transformation: The mappings expressed in the
high-level description of the methodology are realized via
model transformations in the context of process models
formalized in a GPPDL and RCPM as SOPDL. The forward
transformation extracts the relevant and necessary elements
from the initial process and maps them to the corresponding
elements in RCPM resulting in a (reduced) process model,
containing the information needed to be able to add security-
oriented elements. The backward transformation takes into
account the initial process and the security enhanced process.
In this way, information contained in the initial model lost
during forward transformation is recovered. This transforma-
tion completes the initial process with the security-oriented
elements from the enhanced process model. Elements which
have been added to the RCPM process model will be added
in the GPPDL model.
Tool-support: Using the proposed metamodels and the
Eclipse Modeling Framework, ongoing experimental work is
done with SEMCOMDT as a MDE tool-chain supporting the
proposed approach metamodels. We build a set of software
tools, for designing process models, for populating and for
retrieval from the repository. Moreover, we provide tools to
support the management of the repository, the generation of
documentation and the transformations for refinement and
analysis. We choose to derive a text-based syntax to create
instances of the metamodel using the Xtext Framework.
For the description of the model transformations, the QVT
Operational language is used.
VI. APPLICATION TO A SMARTMETER GATEWAY CASE
STUDY
In the context of the TERESA project, we evaluated the
approach to describe the development process of a Smart
Meter Gateway taking into account the Common Criteria
PP for the Gateway of a smart metering system.
Formalized Process: The process consists of nine main
phases from Requirement Analysis and System Design,
Architecture Design down to System Test and Certification.
For demonstration purposes on formalizing this (partially)
security-oriented process model, we will focus on the Ar-
chitecture Design Phase. In Listing 1 are shown excerpts
from the process model.
Phase PhSystemArchitectureDesign {
d e s c r i p t i o n ’ De f in ing the A r c h i t e c t u r e o f the
system−under−development ’
a c t i v i t i e s { AcSof twareArchi tectureDesign ,
SecArchSoftwareArchi tectureDesign ,
AcHardwareArchitectureDesign ,
AcArchi tectureSFRTracing } }
Listing 1. Extract from Metrology Process Model
Security Process Model Library: In the context, of
the SEMCO Project we defined a set of model libraries for
different security approaches. Here, we chose to focus on
CLASP as an approach giving tool support and being able
to be adapted to existing processes.
Adding supplementary Security Concepts
to Metrology Process Model: By typing
PhSystemArchitectureDesign from Listing 1
with Type_CLASPArchitecturalDesign from the
CLASP Library and by model transformations (Step
2 in Figure 1), we will type existing and obtain new
elements in the process model. These elements represent
the concepts of CLASP’s Architectural Design Phase,
net present in the initial process model. An excerpt of
CLASP-enhanced PhSystemArchitectureDesign is given
in Listing 2. Elements added by the refinement with the
CLASP Library are marked with a dashed underline.
Phase PhSystemArchitectureDesign {
d e s c r i p t i o n ’ De f in ing the A r c h i t e c t u r e o f the
system−under−development ’
a c t i v i t i e s { AcSof twareArchi tectureDesign ,
AcHardwareArchitectureDesign ,
AcArchi tectureSFRTracing ,
CLASPSecRiskAssessment3rdParties ,
CLASPSecRequirementsAudit ,
CLASPArchitecture−LevelThreatModeling }
type Type_CLASPArchitecturalDesign }
Secur i tyEng ineer CLASPSecur i tyArchi tect {
type Type_CLASPSecuri tyArchitect }
Listing 2. Extract from CLASP-enhanced Metrology Process Model (focus
on Architecture Design Phase)
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a methodology to enhance
existing process models with security aspect. This is real-
ized by model transformations towards a security-oriented
process modeling language RCPM. The security aspects of
the modeling language are detailed and demonstrated on a
working example through a text-based concrete syntax. The
methodology and the modeling language are validated by
a use case from the metrology domain. The advantages of
the approach are a more direct and intuitive way of adding
security concepts to process models for domain having
strong security requirements. In addition, assistance is given
to the process designer by model type libraries, guiding the
designer to conform with security engineering standards,
guidelines and/or best practices. Despite the advantages of
the approach and RCPM, there are limits to the approach.
RCPM is not able to represent all of the concepts given
in SPEM2 or other GPPDLs, although this might not raise
an issue, since the process concepts needed for security
engineering are kept.
Future work fill focus on other security oriented approaches
like SecSDM or TSP Secure, which are not yet fully adopted
in industry, often lacking support for modeling processes
with their support. Another point for further improvements
is additional validation with industry-based and standard
process models, pushing conformance validation towards
security engineering standards and or guidelines, as well as
extending usability testing.
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